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Contract Pricing and Packer Competition in Fed Cattle Market 
 
Recently,  U.S.  the  cattle  industry  has  undergone  structural  changes  including  increased 
concentration  and  a  greater  degree  of  quasi-vertical  integration  coordinated  through  contract 
procurement often referred to as captive supplies.
1  An implication of these trends is that packers 
are  rapidly  switching  from  traditional  spot  procurement  in  fed  cattle  markets  to  contract 
procurement.  Possible motives for the switch to use contract procurement are to reduce price 
variability  and  manage  risk  and  also  to  reduce  transaction  costs.    Both  packers  and  cattle 
producers  can  potentially  benefit  from  contract  sales  as  packers  insure  themselves  against 
quantity short falls and price fluctuations and cattle producers secure reliable sales and smooth 
price volatility.  For packers, a primary benefit from use of captive supply is to secure fed cattle 
requirements so packing plants can operate at the highest possible level of capacity utilization.  
In addition, they  can potentially  gain control over the type and quality of cattle and reduce 
procurement costs.   
However, contract procurement can reduce public market information because contract 
prices are frequently not reported due to nondisclosure rules. Furthermore, contract procurement 
may reduce competition in the fed cattle spot market, potentially leading to increased market 
power for packers (Ward and Schroeder). Contract procurement potentially allows packers to 
exercise price discrimination in procurement as different prices may be paid for cattle purchased 
through contracts and cattle procured through traditional spot markets. Hence, concerns about 
competitiveness among meatpackers arise.  
                                                 
1 GIPSA defines “captive supply” as cattle owned or fed by a packer, procured through forward contracts and 
marketing agreements, and cattle that are otherwise committed to a packer more than 14 days prior to slaughter. 
Captive supplies is a kind of exclusive contracts 
   3 
While the evidence is not conclusive, most previous empirical studies generally suggest a 
negative  relationship  between  captive  supplies  and  spot  market  prices.    Elam  (1992)  found 
individual states, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, and Texas, varied from no price difference to 
price reductions ranging from $0.15/cwt to $0.37/cwt.  Hayenga and O’Brien (1992) compare the 
average weekly fed cattle price in the same four states and found no conclusive evidence that 
forward contracting decreased fed cattle prices.   Schroeter and Azzam (2003) show a small 
statistically significant negative effect of captive supply volume on cash prices. 
While most previous studies do not examine how contracts facilitate or extend market 
power, MacDonald, et al. argue that contracts can potentially amplify market power through 
entry deterrence, reduced price competition, and discriminatory pricing.
2 Only a few theoretical 
studies have investigated how captive supplies use may be used as a strategy to create or extend 
packer market power.
3  Love and Burton (1999) formalize a strategic rationale whereby packers 
might use captive supplies to extend market power in cattle procurement.  They show that a 
dominant beef processing firm has an incentive to backwardly integrate to simultaneously escape 
efficiency loss and exercise market power in spot market procurements.  However, their model 
does not predict an unambiguous effect of backward integration on spot market price.  Using a 
spatial model, Zhang and Sexton (2000) examine how strategic captive supply procurement can 
affect spot market price. Their model shows that the spot market cattle price can be reduced as 
transportation cost rises. 
Cattle feeders have increasing concerns about the effect of “Top-of-the-Market-Pricing 
(TOMP)” contracts on prices paid by packers for fed cattle.  Contract prices are often established 
                                                 
2 They found packers have an incentive to use contract as a strategic variable for the purpose of increasing market 
power. 
3 Love and Burton (1999); Zhang and Sexton (2000); Xia and Sexton (2004)   4 
based on either nearby spot market price or fed cattle futures market price.  For example, under 
TOMP clauses, contract base price paid to producers is set as the highest spot price at delivery 
time.
4  With TOMP clauses, packers have an incentive to compete less aggressively in spot 
markets in order to reduce input cost in contract markets. 
Recently, Xia and Sexton examined the effect of coexistence of spot and contract markets 
in a one-shot game framework where contract price is determined through TOMP clauses.  They 
find that TOMP clauses reduce competition in the spot market and lower producers’ profits.  
Ironically, they find that feeders favor the contract even though TOMP clauses lead to anti-
competitive  consequences  for  feeders.    Even  with  lower  equilibrium  prices  Xia  and  Sexton 
demonstrate that signing TOMP clauses is a dominant strategy for producers because a producer 
will suffer more loss without contracts.  Their findings, however, are based on the assumption 
that contract price cannot deviate from spot market price. 
In practice, contract prices reflect both observed and unobserved hedonic characteristics 
of  fed  cattle  and  stochastic  market  related  influences.    With  heterogeneous  quality 
characteristics, contract prices might deviate from spot prices giving packers a degree of latitude 
in setting contract price.  In such a situation, packers have an incentive to transform bidding 
strategies in spot markets resulting in additional complications with respect to understanding the 
consequences of TOMP clauses on spot market price.  For example, when there is a sufficiently 
large set of hedonic characteristics it may become hard to find the highest spot market price of 
the same kind of fed cattle. Widely heterogeneous hedonic characteristics will make it physically 
infeasible to trace the price on the spot markets for the same quality of cattle. 
                                                 
4 TOMP clause is discussed first by Davis (2000)   5 
We  extend  Xia  and  Sexton’s  work  on  TOMP  clauses  by  considering  the  effects  of 
hedonic  characteristics  on  contract  price.    This  study  addresses  how  contracts  affect  packer 
market power using a general pricing scheme which considers hedonic characteristics of cattle 
quality.  We employ  a  stage  game to investigate the effects of the  contract procurement on 
packer competition in the spot market.  In particular, we assume a more general relationship 
between contract price and spot market price, which allows us to capture the impacts of captive 
supply, hedonic characteristics of fed cattle, and unobserved stochastic components.  Previous 
models are also extended by assuming cattle feeders may be risk averse.  
1  The Model 
We  assume  a  duopsony  case  in  which  there  are  two  packers  and  N  cattle  feeders  who  are 
engaged  in  contract  and  spot  markets.  Each  feeder  produces  one  unit  of  cattle,  and  only 
participates in one market, either the contract market or the spot market. We assume that feeders 
are risk averse and also price takers (i.e., non-strategic players), and packers are risk neutral who 
maximize their expected profit from both markets. To facilitate the definition of notations, we 
use superscripts “c” and “s” to represent contract and spot markets, subscript i for packer i where 
i=a, b, and subscript k for feeder k where k=1, 2, …, N.  
1.1  Price Formulation in both Markets 
Spot market fed cattle prices are determined by negotiation or bidding.
5  Formula pricing 
with various types of base price are the most general pricing method for fed cattle transaction in 
the  contract  market.
6    The  formula  base  price  is  usually  derived  from  the  various  external 
                                                 
5 Spot market procurement for fed cattle resembles a type of first-price sealed-bid auction, in which, the highest 
bidder wins the cattle in a feedlot. 
6 Formula pricing in the fed cattle usually refers to the method of finding the base price in grid pricing system but, it 
also can include non grid pricing method such as live or dressed (carcass) weight pricing.   6 
including the average price paid at a slaughter plant, wholesale prices, futures prices, or reported 
market average prices (Ward, Schroeder and Feuz).  Fed cattle may be valued on live weight 
basis, carcass (dressed) weight basis, or grid pricing.  Live weight or carcass pricing methods 
apply a uniform average price for the entire lot, while grid pricing is established on a carcass 
basis.  Most spot market sales are priced on a live weight basis while contact sales are based on 
carcass weight since most formulas are based upon dressed weights. 
We assume feeders who accept the contract are paid a higher base price than in the spot 
market. However, on average, the observed contract price can deviate from the base price to 
reflect cattle quality attributes or so-called hedonic characteristics. Pricing methods in both spot 
and contract markets are linked to cattle quality attributes, 
m
k z , associated with feeder k and 
cattle  market  m.    There  are  various  factors  differentiate  cattle  quality  attributes,  including 
average live weight of cattle, average dressing percentage of cattle, number of head in the lot, 
distance from the feedlot to slaughter plant, type of cattle,  yield  grade and quality  grade of 
feedlots. We emphasize one particular factor which plays a vita role in determining cattle quality, 
the effort of each feeder. Feeders’ efforts, denoted by 
m
k e , influence management-based activities 
which are important quality attributes.  





k e e ε α + = ) ( z  where  ( ) 0 = ε m E  and  ( )
m
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, 2 σ ε = . 
This assumption suggests a constant and positive marginal effect of feeders’ effort on cattle 
quality  attributes.  That  is,  feeders  utilize  a  higher  effort  level  will  delivery  a  better  quality 
attributes  of  their  cattle.  It  also  shows  that  the  marginal  effect  may  variant  with  respect  to 
different  markets.  The  possible  reason  could  be  feeders  in  the  certain  market  may  be  more   7 
efficient to convert their effort to quality attributes. The variation of cattle quality attributes in 
contract and spot markets could also differ. For example, the variance of cattle attributes in 
contract market can be smaller than spot market variance since dressing percentage is difficult to 
accurately estimate under live weight pricing but dressed weight pricing eliminate the risk of 
incorrect estimation. We use 
s , 2 σ and 
c , 2 σ to measure the variation of hedonic quality attributes 
in spot and contract markets. 
Packers  directly  pay  for  quality  attribute  rather  than  feeders’  effort  level.  Thus,  the 
potential moral hazard problem is greatly avoided since quality attributes can be observed or 
obtained in spot and contract markets, while feeders’ effort is privately hold information.  
Assumption 2   The transaction price paid to feeder k in the spot market price is written as 




k e w W z δ + = , 
where  ) (
s
k e z  is defined by equation (1). 
s w is a price component not relating to hedonic quality 
attributes and  s δ  is the unit prices of hedonic quality attribute  ) (
s
k e z .  
Assumption 2 suggests that actual transaction price in the spot market can be decomposed into 
market price component and non-market hedonic price components.   
Assumption 3   Contract price 
c
k W is based on the spot market price and certain hedonic quality 
attributes:
7 










k e e w e W E W z z z δ δ β δ β + + = + =  
Assumption 3 suggests that the contract price consists of two parts: formula-based spot market 
price and price paid for certain hedonic quality attributes. Spot and contract markets may be 
                                                 
7 Xia and Sexton’s model assume the deviation of contract price from spot market price is not allowed. In their 




i w W h W W = = = ) (    8 
interested in different quality attributes, and they may put different weights on the same quality 
attributes as well. We use  c δ as the unit prices paid for the quality attributes that of interest to the 
contract market.  
Assumption  3  is  consistent  with  the  contract  procurement  in  cattle  industry.  Packers 
normally procure the cattle in feedlot base instead of buying individual cattle.  Thus, reported 
prices are based on the average cattle characteristic of the feedlots sold in specified periods and 
geographic areas.  Therefore, we assume average spot market price as a base price of contract 
market.    Also,  hedonic  characteristics  of  cattle  produced  in  contract  market  is  included  in 
contract market pricing scheme to reflect the quality difference between each feedlot in contract 
market. The key component in contracts is to define β. We expect β is greater than 1, which 
ensures that feeders who accept contract will have a higher price than those in the spot market. 
We will examine our expectation later to confirm.  
1.2  Stage Game 
Figure 1 illustrates the stage game by specifying the actions undertaken by packers and feeders 
and the corresponding choice variables in each stage. We assume this game evolves in three 
stages, and both contract and spot markets sequentially evolve.  
In first stage, two packers A and B choose a number of feeders, 
c
A n  and
c
B n , to offer the 
contracts, respectively. They also decide weights that they apply to the average spot market price 
as the price base and the price premium paid to certain quantity attributes. Feeders who are 
offered the contract decide to accept or reject the offer. Feeders will accept the contract if they 
obtain a high profit by participating in the contract market. We assume that feeders who are 
offered the contract always accept the contract to sell on the contract market when solving the   9 
stage game.
8 We revisit this issue by compare the profit without contract and with contract later 
to  confirm  our  assumption.  In  second  stage,  all  feeders  no  matter  whether  they  accept  the 
contract or not choose their effort level to optimally produce quality attributes. In the last stage, 
packers  A  and  B  competes  in  spot  market  to  purchase  cattle  that  are  not  committed  in  the 
contract market to maximize his expected profit, respectively.  That is, packers A and B purchase 
cattle from 
s
A n  and 
s












Figure 1: Actions and Choices Variable in the Stage Game 
 
1.3  Solving the Stage Game Using Backward Deduction 
 
Given the game structure illustrated in Figure 1, we use backward deduction to analytically solve 
the rest of stage game.  
                                                 
8 In real market contract price is, on average, higher than spot price. Xia and Sexton (2004) show why rational 
producers accept the contract  
• All feeders choose their effort level no 





• Packers A and B offer contracts to feeders 
• Feeders who are offered the contract decide 
to accept or reject 
• Packers compete in the spot market to 
purchase cattle that are not committed in 
the contract market 
• 
c
i n : number of feeders who 
accept contract from package i 
• β  and δ c: Weights on the 
average spot market and 
hedonic quality attributes 
m
i e : effort level by feeders in the 
contract or spot market  
Stages  Actions taken by packers and feeders  Choice Variables 
s
i n : number of feeders whose 
have transaction with package i 
in the spot market 
•      10 
(1)  Stage III: Spot Market 








A n n N + −  feeders left in the spot market to sell their fed cattle.  Assume that aggregate spot 
market supply function of feeders takes the following functional form:
9  
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To simplify the model, following Xia and Sexton (2004) we assume that  s
k
s
k W W = Φ ) ( . The 
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The total profit for packer i from both the contract and spot markets is written as  











k i n n TC n W p n W p − − + − = π    for  i = A, B                   
where  p is  the  output  price,  ) (⋅ TC   is  total  processing  cost  function  for  packer  i,  which  is 
assumed to be constant. is a number of feeder (also the total quantity of cattle purchased) in the 
contract  (m=c)  or  spot  (m=s)  market.  In  stage  III  packers  choose  the  quantity  of  cattle  to 
purchase in the sport market  ( ) s
i n given that he/she already has a contract quantity  c
i n . That is, 
                                                 
9 We assume the linear supply function. The supply function only represents non-hedonic components settled at spot 
market.    11 
packer  i  maximize  the  expected  profit  specified  in  equation  (11)  by  choosing  s
i n .  Taking 
derivate of equation (11) with respect to 
s
i n  yields the first order condition,  
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=  for packer B.  
Solving  equations  (9-a)  and  (9-b)  simultaneously  we  obtain  the  Cournot-Nash  equilibrium 
quantities in the spot market conditional on the contract market equilibrium: 












































Substituting equations (10-a) and (10-b) into equation (6) yields the equilibrium price in the spot 
market,  
(15)  ( )































.   
(2)  Stage II: Feeders’ choice of their effort level in both markets 
We assume feeders’ cost function per unit of cattle is  








k e e c c + = ,    12 
where  c0  is  the  cost  of  other  inputs  besides  the  effort.  We  assume  that  feeders’  unit  profit 
function is  















k e W c π ,  
where 
m
k W  is defined either by equation (2) for the spot market price or equation (3) for the 
contract  market  price.  Furthermore,  we  assume  that feeder  k  maximizes  the  expected  utility 
which follows the mean-variance functional form by choosing the effort level,  
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π π , 
where  0 > k γ  is a constant absolute risk aversion.  
Proposition 1: Feeders’ optimal effort level in the spot and contract markets are  
(19)  m m
m
k e α δ =  for m=s or c.  
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Substituting equation (16) and variance into the expected utility yields  
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 − = .      
The necessary first order condition for the optimal effort level is  
0
) ( ) ( ,
























which explicitly define the optimal effort level, i.e.,  m m
m
k e α δ = .         ■ 
Proposition 1 shows that feeders who accept contract exert the effort level of  c c
c
k e α δ =  and 
those  who  participate  in  the  spot  market  utilize  their  effort  level  of  s s
s
k e α δ = .  That  is,  all   13 
feeders engaged in the same market have an identical effort level. The difference of the effort 
level  between  two  markets  depends  on  the  weights  of  hedonic  quality  attributes  and  the 
conversion efficiency from the effort to quality.  
(3)  Stage I: Contract market 
Substituting equation (15) and equation (19) for m=c into equation (3) yield the contract price: 
(20)  ( )
α δ
β β
α δ β 2 2
2
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The total expected profit for packer i is the same as in equation   












k i n n TC n W p n W p E E − − + − = π    for  i = A, B. 
The only difference between equations (7) and (21) is that packers expect their profit in the first 
stage since the spot market activities have not been realized yet. Thus, feeders maximize the 
expected  profit  in  the  first  stage  by  choosing  the  optimal  quantity  or  number  of  feeders  to 
contract with in this case.  Furthermore, feeders know the best response function of the spot 
market  quantity  written  in  equations  (12-a)  and  (12-b)  conditional  on  the  contract  market 
quantity. Therefore, feeder i’s maximization problem is given below: 
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Where 
s
i n  is written in equation (12-a) for i=A or (12-b) for i=B. The necessary  first order 
condition is  
 (27)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ) ( 1 ) ( 3
2 2 2 = + − − − + − − − − =
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2
3 2 3 2 2 β
α δ β
+
− − − =
p p
p p V c c .    14 
Because  of  the  symmetric  condition  in  the  spot  or  contract  market,  simultaneously  solving 
equation (27) for i=A and i=B yields the optimal contract market quantity for two packers: 
(28) 
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where  2 2 2 3 ) 8 ( 9 9 β β α δ − + − − = ∆ p p p c c .  
Once  we  obtain  the  optimal  contract  quantity,  we  are  able  to  derive  all  the  other  relevant 
information in the contract and spot markets. Substituting equation (28) into equations (12-a) and 
(12-b) yields the spot market equilibrium quantity: 
(29) 
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Similarly, we obtain the expected contract and spot market price below: 
(30-a) 
( ) ( ) ( )
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2  Discussion of Some Expected Results 
Based on our model set-up, we expect the following results: 
•  The optimal choices of the weight of the spot market price( ) β  and the price premium of 
quality attribute ( ) δ
2
c   specified in contracts: Taking the derivative of packer i’s total   15 
profit function with respect to β  and δ
2
c , and then solve these two first order condtions 
simultaneously will result in the optimal choice ofβ  and δ
2
c . Mathematically, the 
optimal β  and δ
2
c  are implicitly determined by the following two equations: 
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c is defined in equation (28).  
•  Once we solve the optimal price premium of quality attributes specified in contracts, we 
are able to identify factors which can enhance feeders’ efforts in the contract market to 
induce a higher cattle quality.  
•  The comparison of profits of feeders in the contract and spot market will tell the 
conditions under which feeders will always accept the contract in the first stage when the 
contract is offered by the packer.  
3  Concluding Remarks 
We use a game-theoretical framework to analyze the coexistence of spot and contract markets in 
the cattle industry. A duopsony scenario with two packers and N feeders is used to reflect the 
reality in the cattle industry. Our main contribution is to incorporate the risk components and the 
pricing of hedonic attributes of cattle quality. Our preliminary results show that packers have an 
incentive to transform bidding strategies in spot markets when a series of hedonic characteristics 
play some significant roles in establishing cattle prices in contract market. That is, we will show 
that the effectiveness of contract with TOMP clauses on packer competition in a spot market   16 
depends on whether there is a correlation between spot price and hedonic characteristics. The 
results may shed light on understanding potential effects of captive supplies on market power 
and may aid in the assessment of the policies designed to enhance competition in the cattle 
industry.  
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